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Susceptibility to Flooding as a Redhibitory Defect in a Home
Millspaw v. Knight,' Bain v. Anderson2 and Smith v. H.J. Landreneau
Building Contractor' are the latest in a growing line of cases holding that
susceptibility to flooding or water intrusion is a redhibitory defect in a
home.4 Some questions remain unanswered in this area, but many are
now answerable. For example, any telltale signs of prior inundation or
seepage will call for a further investigation by the prospective purchaser
such as is reasonable under the circumstances.5 A home adjacent to a
drainage canal, stream or culvert arguably must be treated as one poten-
tially afflicted with the vice of flood-susceptibility so that a further in-
vestigation in the form of an inquiry to the seller is necessary, while homes
not adjacent to the drainage canal or other obvious sources of flooding
do not call for any special inquiry or investigation.' In Smith, even
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1. 430 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
2. 427 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
3. 426 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
4. Lemonier v. Coco, 237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436 (1959) (buyer contented himself
with a reduction in price when susceptibility to flooding during heavy rains was due to
improperly graded foundation); Cox v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979)
(buyer contented himself with a reduction in price when susceptibility to flooding was due
to an inadequate culvert, a redhibitory vice); Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So. 2d 549 (La. 1978) (flooding from a drainage canal;
court awarded a 20% reduction in price); Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1971) (water intrusion through a cracked foundation). The Millspaw case involved
inadequate drainage which rendered the backyard unusable for long periods following a
rain. An improperly graded courtyard and patio resulted in water seepage into the habita-
tion in Bain, while the home in Smith was in a city-designated flood zone and suffered
flooding from a nearby coulee.
5. Pursell v. Kelly, 244 La. 323, 152 So. 2d 36 (La. 1963); Bain v. Anderson, 427
So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). The fact that the house or lot has flooded on one
or possibly even several occasions does not mean that there is necessarily a susceptibility
to flooding. Therefore, the seller need disclose only the susceptibility to flooding-not the
fact of prior flooding. Smith v. Kennedy, 392 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); cf.
Nicholson v. Ellerbe, 434 So. 2d 1146 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (buyer shown to be aware
of prior flooding).
6. Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So.
2d 549 (La. 1978); Cox v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). In the words
of the Davis opinion:
The lot was not adjacent to the drainage canal, but across a street; its relative
position as the geographical low point in the area was not visible to the naked
eye; water marks left in remote areas of the house by the earlier flooding were
not discoverable on a simple inspection . . ..
353 So. 2d at 1063. See also Nicholson v. Ellerbe, 434 So. 2d 1146 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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knowledge by the purchaser that the lot in question and the adjacent lot
and house had previously flooded did not make apparent the flood-
susceptibility of the home purchased.' Typically, improper grading of the
lot or slab, or of adjacent lots, is not an apparent vice. Also, improper
drainage is generally not discoverable upon a simple inspection, unless
recent heavy rains had fallen at the time of inspection.'
The property in Smith was included in a city-designated flood zone,
but there was no evidence that the purchaser knew this fact. Moreover,
the court did not suggest that he was expected to consult the public records
as a part of a simple inspection.9 The prevalence of seller assurances,
concealment, and misrepresentation'" makes further meaningful analysis
of the issue of the purchaser's inspection in the flood-susceptibility cases
difficult.
The purchaser, of course, must prove that the defect existed at the
time of sale, but.this factor has not been a significant one in the flood-
susceptibility cases decided to date. Improper grading and slab construc-
tion, as well as some cases of inadequate drainage, can be viewed as design
defects, obviously existing at the time of sale, whether or not there have
7. The house purchased in Smith had not flooded, although the lot on which it sat
did. The lot itself was about 225 feet from a drainage canal. Cf. Smith v. Kennedy, 392
So. 2d 177 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980) (seller need not disclose fact of prior flooding unless
such represents a susceptibility to flooding).
8. Lemonier v. Coco, 237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436 (1959); Millspaw v. Knight, 430
So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Bain v. Anderson, 427 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1983). The slab in Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) was
cracked and separated, but there was no "reason to suspect" that such a condition existed.
9. The purchaser in Millspaw did check the city flood plain map, but the house in
question was not shown to be in a flood plain. The Smith case does not suggest that Civil
Code article 2521 is concerned with constructive notice. See La. H.R. 246, 9th Reg.
Sess. (1983) (would require disclosure in the act of sale of the flood zone designation of
the property), deferred in committee HOUSE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LAW AND PROCEDURE,
9TH REG. SESS., MINUTES OF MEETING-MAY 2, 1983, at 5 (Comm. Print 1983).
10. Concealment occurred in Bain v. Anderson, 427 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983),
if the purchaser's evidence that the seller's tenants told the seller of water seepage on two
occasions prior to the sale is believed. In Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1971), the seller concealed the defective slab with carpeting and, to the purchaser's
inquiry about drainage around the house, replied that the house had flooded on one prior
occasion, which the seller attributed to the inability of a subsequently replaced and im-
proved culvert to handle an abnormal rainfall of eleven inches. The house had flooded,
in fact, at least five times during the seller's occupancy. In Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d
1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So. 2d 549 (La. 1978), the seller concealed
the prior instances of flooding from a nearby drainage canal, and during an inspection
of the house, the seller falsely answered the purchaser's inquiry about the presence of new
flooring by attributing it to a malfunctioning central air-conditioning system. In Smith v.
H.J. Landreneau Bldg. Contractor, 426 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), the seller's
response to the purchaser's inquiries about flooding was that while the adjacent lot had
flooded, the house in question had not flooded in the past and would not in the future
because the nearby coulee had been cleaned out.
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been prior instances of flooding. Some defects that lead to flooding may
exist at the time of sale but only become manifest thereafter.' 2 In other
cases, however, the defect will only come into existence after the sale,
caused perhaps by settling of the slab,' 3 subsequent construction, nearby
grading"' or changes in the natural drainage of the area. While the
explanation for the susceptibility of the house to flooding may be the
fault of city planners, building contractors, or even the Corp of Engineers,
redhibition is a matter of warranty and not of fault.' 5 Moreover, most
flood-prone houses are" obviously not amenable to correction of the defect
by the seller.' 6
The purchasers in Millspaw, Bain and Smith contented themselves with
a reduction in price." Such solution is, in fact, the norm in house-sale
litigation,'" reflective, no doubt, of appreciation in property values and
more recently of rising mortgage rates. Even the purchaser who seeks a
restoration of the price may find that the court will award only a reduc-
11. The following cases seem to fall into the design defect category. Lemonier v. Coco,
237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436 (1959); Bain v. Anderson, 427 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1983); Smith v. H.J. Landreneau Bldg. Contractor, 426 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1983); Cox v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); Davis v. Davis, 353 So.
2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So. 2d 549 (La. 1978). No prior flooding
occurred in Lemonier, Cox and Milispaw, but prior flooding tends to solve the existing-at-
the-time-of-sale problem. See Bain v. Anderson, 427 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983);
Smith v. H.J. Landreneau Bldg. Contractor, 426 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983);
Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So. 2d 549
(La. 1978); Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971). But prior flooding
is not the equivalent of susceptibility to flooding. See Smith v. Kennedy, 392 So. 2d 177
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
12. See Millspaw v. Knight, 430 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
13. Cf. Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) (crack in slab
existed before the sale in question, but probably did not exist prior to the original sale
of the house).
14. Millspaw v. Knight, 430 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), concludes that the
defect was in existence at the time of sale, but there was no evidence that the seller had
experienced any flooding. The facts suggest that the drainage in the area was changed at
some point near in time to the sale. In Cox v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1979), for example, the problem of a culvert of insufficient diameter was aggravated by
an asphalt overlay of up to eight inches on the city streets.
15. Cox v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (citing Hob's Refrig. &
Air Cond. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La. 1974)).
16. A flooding problem caused by poor natural drainage of rainwater (and not associated
with a stream or drainage canal) may be correctable. Cf. Millspaw v. Knight, 430 So. 2d
1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (the purchaser undertook various corrective measures); Cox
v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979) (the city's installation of a larger culvert
may have cured the defect).
17. LA. Ctv. CODE art. 2541.
18. Lemonier v. Coco, 237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436 (1959); Cox v. Moore, 367 So.
2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); see, e.g., Fraser v. Ameling, 277 So. 2d 633 (La. 1973)
(termite damage); Tuminello v. Mawby, 220 La. 733, 57 So. 2d 666 (1952) (inadequate
foundation); Hunter v. Wilson, 355 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (leaky roof).
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tion in the price.19 The measure of recovery in a quanti minoris action
involving immovable property is said to be the amount necessary to con-
vert the unsound structure into a sound one." ° But, as pointed out pre-
viously, not all flood-prone houses can be so "converted"; in such cases,
the amount of reduction is the difference between the sale price and the
price to which a reasonable buyer and seller would have agreed had they
known of the defects." The goal is to arrive at a figure which represents
19. Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So.
2d 549 (La. 1978). In fact, such is not an infrequent outcome of the redhibition action
involving a house. See Copple v. Gonyea, 431 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Prat
v. Heymann, 410 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (cracking in walls; soil and founda-
tion sinkage); Goldberg v. Oliver, 212 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). Restoration
of the price was awarded in Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971),
a water intrusion case. Restoration of the price has been frequently awarded in cases in-
volving "serious" defects. See Abdelbaki v. University Presbyterian Church, 380 So. 2d
35 (La. 1980) (termite damage); Stack v. Irwin, 246 La. 777, 167 So. 2d 363 (1964) (defec-
tive foundation slab and water seepage); Drewes v. Giangrosso, 429 So. 2d 198 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1983) (property lacked a source of water); Connella v. Bloch, 379 So. 2d 60 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1979) (termite infestation); Bernofsky v. Schwartz, 370 So. 2d 590 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1979) (unlevel floor; shortage in square footage); cf. Van Vracken v. Harry J.
Spiro, Inc., 139 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (rescission for nullity).
20. Lemonier v. Coco, 237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436 (1959); McEachern v. Plauche
Lumber & Constr. Co., 220 La. 696, 57 So. 2d 405 (1952). The proper amount to be awarded
in a reduction of the price case involving movable property is the difference, at the time
of the sale, between the value of the thing as sold in its defective condition and its value
as warranted. Iberia Cypress Co, v. Von Schoeler, 121 La. 72, 46 So. 105 (1908); Menville
v. Stephens Chevrolet, Inc., 300 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974). But, as explained
in Lemonier, that measure of recovery is inappropriate in an immovable property case because,
unless there has been an immediate resale, the difference between "as warranted" and "as
is" will not be readily ascertainable. Typically, the "amount necessary to convert the un-
sound structure into a sound one" can be expressed as simply the cost of repairs. Lemonier,
237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436; Wilfamco, Inc. v. Interstate Elec. Co., 221 La. 142, 58 So.
2d 833 (1952). This measure of reduction in price was used in Bain v. Anderson, 427 So.
2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
21. Millspaw v. Knight, 430 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); McGuire v. Masino,
325 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975). In Menville v. Stephens Chevrolet, Inc., 300
So. 2d 858, 861-62 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), Judge Lemmon explains:
When a judge orders reduction of the sale price, one of the principal elements
in formulating the award is the cost of repairing the defects which existed at the
time of the sale. The cost of repairs, however, is not necessarily the sole measure
of the diminution of value resulting from these defects. If the defects are few
in number and quickly and simply remedied, the cost of repair may well be the
only consideration. But when the defects are numerous and the repairs lengthy
and frequent, then a greater reduction is warranted, because a forewarned buyer
would not reasonably pay the full price, reduced only by the cost of repairs, if
he knew the extensive repairs of the defects would significantly curtail his use
and cause him considerable inconvenience and aggravation. . ..
To prove the theoretical price to which the actual sale price should be reduced,
a plaintiff attempts to establish the fair value as of the time of the sale, if the
defects had been known. Evidence as to this theoretical value may consist of ex-
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the devaluation of the house caused by the susceptibility to water
intrusion.22 Great discretion is lodged in the trial court to arrive at a
reasonable figure to compensate the purchaser for the inconvenience and
loss of use caused by the defect,23 but as with sales of movables, proof
of the amount of the reduction virtually requires expert testimony that
goes beyond mere guesswork. 4 The actual cost of repairs may in some
cases be disproportionate to the value of the structure. 21 In such cases,
pert opinion testimony, of costs expended to place the thing in sound condition,
or of other facts bearing on the reduced price a forewarned buyer would have
paid and a seller with knowledge of the defects would have accepted. But in the
final analysis the trier of fact cannot mathematically calculate what price the par-
ties would have agreed to, if they had known of the defects; the trier must con-
sider the overall evidence and, using limited discretion, must set a reduced sale
price which fictionally represents the fair value at the time of sale.
In Firmin v. Frantom, 354 So. 2d 1089 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), the court, relying on
the Menville case, held that a forewarned buyer would not be required to accept a mere
cost of repair reduction where the market value was adversely affected by the fact that
the home had experienced a foundation defect, in that even a repaired defect may still
reduce that value below what it would have been without the defect.
22. Millspaw v. Knight, 430 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (price of $105,000
reduced by $7,823, representing devaluation and cost of repair efforts); Smith v. H.J.
Landreneau Bldg. Contractor, 426 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (reduction of 10076
of purchase price); Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied,
355 So. 2d 549 (La. 1978) (purchase price of $23,650 reduced by $4,730).
23. Amin v. Head, 419 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Lemoine v. Hebert, 395
So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). Discretionary awards for inconvenience and aggrava-
tion have been made in many price reduction cases. See, e.g., Amin, 419 So. 2d 529; Welch
v. Community Motors, 422 So. 2d 1196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Lacey v. Baywood Truck
& Mach., 381 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). But see Betz v. Reynaud Constr. Co.,
396 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Lemonier v. Coco, 237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436 (1959),
indicated that the price obtained on a resale by the purchaser could be relevant, as could
added improvements to the property, the general rise in property values in the area and
depreciation due to use. But the second circuit made it clear in Davis v. Davis, 353 So.
2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So. 2d 549 (La. 1978), that neither
inflationary increases in property value nor flood insurance adequately compensate the pur-
chaser for the diminution in property value due to susceptibility to flooding. Of course,
out-of-pocket expenses for repairs or correction of the problem should be recoverable by
the purchaser. See Millspaw v. Knight, 430 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
24. Real estate appraisers or other experts appeared in Millspaw; Bain; Smith; Lemonier
v. Coco, 237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436 (1959); Amin v. Head, 419 So. 2d 529 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1982); Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355
So. 2d 549 (La. 1978). In McEarchern v. Plauche Lumber & Constr. Co., 220 La. 696,
57 So. 2d 405 (1952), the purchaser's expert prevailed on the basis of a repair estimate
of $4738 which was based on a thorough examination of the structure and its foundation
on two separate occasions, and which contained separately itemized entries; the seller's witness
made only a vague estimate following a casual inspection. See also Faust v. Pelican Plumb-
ing Supply, 215 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Bozeman v. McDonald, 40 So. 2d
517 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
25. While an award of $4,200 to repair termite damage in a 40-year-old house which
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the purchaser cannot expect a reduction in price reflective of the total
repair expense, since in many cases such an award would not truly repre-
sent the amount necessary to merely convert the unsound structure into
a sound one.
2 6
An award of damages and attorneys' fees depends on a showing of
knowledge of the defect, which the Civil Code equates with bad faith.27
sold for $26,000 was not disproportionate in Fraser v. Ameling, 277 So. 2d 633 (La. 1973),
a $9,871 repair estimate on a termite-damaged building valued at $12,000 was said to appear
inequitable and far out of proportion to the price paid in Purcell v. Kelly, 244 La. 323,
152 So. 2d 36 (1963). The Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that in such a case, rescission
may be the just remedy, so long as the purchaser can place the seller in the status quo
ante. See also Bustamante v. Manale, 397 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Verlander
v. Hoffer, 351 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
26. Examples are provided by Verlander v. Hoffer, 351 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1977), and Bermes v. Facell, 328 So. 2d 722 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). In Verlander, a
leaking roof in a 25-year-old home was replaced at an expense of $3800, but the buyer
was thus given a roof that would last longer than the original 25-year-old roof would have
lasted. Because some deterioration in the old roof was to be expected by one buying such
a home, the court felt that the lowest amount of reduction in price the parties would have
agreed to had they known of the defective roof was $1500. In Bermes, the home was equip-
ped with a seven-year-old, three-ton capacity air conditioning system which was inadequate
to properly cool the home. The buyer replaced the three-ton unit with a four-ton unit at
an expense of $1930, although a three and a half-ton unit would have been adequate and
could have been acquired for between $1450 and $1830. Thus, the buyer ended up not
only having a new unit, but one of larger capacity. The court awarded a reduction of $1350.
Of course, replacement can be a less expensive route than repair. See Mattes v. Heintz,
69 So. 2d 924 (La. App. Orl. 1954); see also Slagle v. Morgan, 410 So. 2d 371 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1982); Ruehmkorf v. McCartney, 121 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
Awards beyond mere cost of repair of the immovable thing have been made where
some damage has been caused by the defect or where the repair cannot be accomplished
without some incidental structural or interior damage. Busenlener v. Peck, 316 So. 2d 27
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) (awarding $374 for repairs to roof and $258 to restore a water-
damaged bedroom to the condition it should have been in at the time of the sale); Mattes
v. Heintz, 69 So. 2d 924 (La. App. Orl. 1954) (awarding $808 for rerouting of leaking
pipe and attendant plastering, tile replacement and painting). But see Fraser v. Ameling,
277 So. 2d 633 (La. 1973) (awarding $4200 for repair of termite damage, but not awarding
$600 in damage to the walls caused during the repair operations). Cf. Domingue v. Whirlpool
Corp., 303 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) (awarding restoration of the price of a
defective central air-conditioning unit, but not awarding the damage caused thereby to the
purchaser's property).
27. Civil Code article 2545 does not use the term "bad faith," but in the language
"knows of the vice . . . and omits to declare it," unmistakably resides the element of
bad faith. The article immediately following, which refers to article 2545, is labeled: "Prescrip-
tion . . . when seller in bad faith." Concealment, of course, is considered to be fraudulent
in the Civil Code. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1832, 1847.
Seller's knowledge of susceptibility to flooding was shown in Bain v. Anderson, 427
So. 2d 60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1977), writ denied, 355 So. 2d 549 (La. 1978); Ford v. Broussard, 248 So. 2d 629 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1971), with attorneys' fees awarded of $2000, $1500 and $500, respectively.
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Moreover, when the seller is shown to be in bad faith, the prescriptive
period is one year from the discovery of the vice,2" and the purchaser's
renunciation of redhibition is not obligatory.2 9 With respect to sales of
movables, the idea has developed that a manufacturer, or one who occupies
that position, is amenable to suit in redhibition without regard to privity
of contract,3" and such a party is conclusively presumed to know of any
defects in the thing sold.' The idea that the builder-vendor of a home
is similarly presumed to know of the defects in the thing is now well
established, 32 so the purchaser of the house susceptible to flooding can
recover attorneys' fees33 and damages3 ' without proof of the builder-
vendor's actual knowledge of the vice.
The Bain decision makes the point that the attorney's fee award was intended by the legislature
as punishment for the bad faith seller; therefore, there is no relationship between the fee
award and the award for price reduction which would cause a fee award to be labelled
"excessive." 427 So. 2d at 63.
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2546.
29. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2548.
30. The decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Media Prod. Consultants v.
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972); Moreno's, Inc. v. Lake
Charles Catholic High Schools, Inc., 315 So. 2d 660 (La. 1975); and Alexander v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 359 So. 2d 607 (La. 1978), have made moot whatever theoretical arguments
there might have been that the Civil Code itself requires privity in a suit for redhibition.
See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2439 ("The contract of sale is an agreement by which one gives
a thing for a price, . . .and the other gives the price." (emphasis added)); Newman v.
Dixie Sales & Serv., 387 So. 2d 1333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
31. See, e.g., Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So. 2d 607 (La. 1978); Moreno's,
Inc. v. Lake Charles Catholic High Schools, Inc., 315 So. 2d 660 (La. 1975); Doyle v.
Fuerst & Kraemer, 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911). The knowledge of the defects so presumed
or imputed was equated to bad faith or fraud in Moreno's for purposes of applying Civil
Code articles 2534 and 2546. 315 So. 2d at 663-64. Although the issue has not been squarely
addressed, the presumed knowledge idea may also be equated to fraud for purposes of
neutering renunciations of warranty under Civil Code article 2548. See Aetna Ins. Co. v.
General Elec. Co., 362 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 365 So. 2d
247 (La. 1978) (conceding that "perhaps a manufacturer can never stipulate against
warranty").
32. See, e.g., Tuminello v. Mawby, 220 La. 733, 57 So. 2d 666 (1952); Smith v. H.J.
Landreneau Bldg. Contractor, 426 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Amin v. Head,
419 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). But cf. Arnold v. Lloyd, 387 So. 2d 640 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1980) (declining to award attorneys' fees against a builder-vendor not shown
to have actual knowledge of the defects; issue of builder as a manufacturer not discussed).
33. Fees of $2500, $4350 and $3000, respectively, were awarded in Smith v. H.J.
Landreneau Bldg. Contractor, 426 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Amin v. Head,
419 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); and Cox v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1979), all involving builder-vendors.
34. See Smith v. H.J. Landreneau Bldg. Contractor, 426 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1983) (awarding $7500 for property damage); Cox v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1979) (awarding damages for carpet cleaning and replacement, the cost of moving
into and out of the house, and the cost of moving a fence).
Of course, when a sale is rescinded, a successful purchaser can recover expenses in-
19831
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The remaining issues of interest, not clearly resolved by the courts,
are: (1) whether privity of contract is a requirement in the home-sale case;
(2) if not, whether a purchaser may "jump over" intermediary purchaser-
sellers to sue the original vendor-builder, within one year of discovery
of the vice;3" (3) whether the builder-contractor should be treated the same
curred in preservation of the thing sold or those "occasioned" by the sale. Expenses occa-
sioned by the sale in the home sale case would include: official fees, such as for filing
or recording, Drewes v. Giangrosso, 429 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); finance charges,
Abdelbaki v. University Presbyterian Church, 380 So. 2d 35 (La. 1980); Perrin v. Read
Imports, 359 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); loan appraisal and closing costs, Abdelbaki,
380 So. 2d 35; Drewes, 429 So. 2d 198; Bernofsky v. Schwartz, 370 So. 2d 590 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1979); premiums for property insurance, Abdelbaki, 380 So. 2d 35; moving expenses,
Bernofsky, 370 So. 2d 590; loan prepayment penalties and costs of reconveyance, Abdelbaki,
380 So. 2d 35; Drewes, 429 So. 2d 198; Bernofsky, 370 So. 2d 590; and costs and liability
to third parties, such as incurred in pest control contracts, id. Not considered as "expenses
occasioned" are items of damages (which are not recoverable against a good faith seller)
such as loss of use, rental expense of a substitute thing, or the difference in price between
the defective thing and the thing purchased in its place. See Beyer v. Estopinal, 224 La.
516, 70 So. 2d 109 (1954); Slay v. Ater, 305 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Cain
v. Rapides Dodge, 207 So. 2d 918 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
Costs incurred for preservation of the thing also anticipate a rescission of the sale and
a return of the thing to the seller. Therefore, if a buyer incurs expenses in having per-
formed repairs that the seller was obligated, but refused or was unable, to perform, such
expenses are recoverable as "incurred in preservation" of the thing. Those repair or replace-
ment expenses not related to preserving the thing from damage or deterioration are not
recoverable; nonpermanent, normal maintenance expenses are included within this category.
See Drewes, 429 So. 2d 198; Bernofsky, 370 So. 2d 590. Expenses incidental to repairs
or replacements are recoverable. Generally speaking, a credit for use will be deducted from
the amount awarded to the purchaser in a restoration of price case. See Abdelbaki, 380
So. 2d 35; Bernofsky, 370 So. 2d 590.
35. The decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Media Prod. Consultants v.
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972), certainly eliminated privity
as a requirement in redhibition suits involving new automobiles, and most likely involving
other mass-produced and mass-distributed consumer products, but the court did not necessarily
eliminate privity in the context of a home sale. Compare Breaux v. Laird, 230 La. 221,
88 So. 2d 33 (1956); McEachern v. Plauche Lumber & Constr. Co., 220 La. 696, 57 So.
2d 405 (1952); Landry v. Baton Rouge Lumber Co., 434 So. 2d 1144 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1983) and DeSoto v. Ellis, 393 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) with Cipriano v. Superior
Realty & Constr. Corp., 228 La. 1065, 84 So. 2d 822 (1955) and LeBlanc v. Ellerbee Builders,
317 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975). See also Overby v. Beach, 220 La. 77, 55 So. 2d
873 (1951); Slagle v. Morgan, 410 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Russell v. Bartlett,
139 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). The first circuit in LeBlanc distinguished Media
factually.
The Media opinion suggests that the correct basis for holding a manufacturer solidarily
liable with the seller is that the manufacturer is the original vendor, and under French law
an intermediate seller would transmit to the purchaser his right to sue the original vendor.
262 La. at 89 n.3, 262 So. 2d at 381 n.3; Huffman-Euro Motors v. Physical Therapy Serv.,
373 So. 2d 565 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979). That idea was presented in the LeBlanc case,
but the intended target, a subcontractor, was not in the chain of title and could not have
transmitted any rights to the purchaser. The LeBlanc opinion does not, therefore, rule out
the theory in an appropriate case. Cf. Daly v. Abramson, 117 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1960) (defendant vendor impleaded in warranty his vendor).
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as the builder-seller;36 and (4) what exposure is faced by the realtor and
financial institution in the flood-susceptibility cases.37
The FTC's Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Sale of Used
Motor Vehicles
Following the Federal Trade Commission's adoption of the Used
Motor Vehicle Rule,38 the rule was challenged in a legal action by represen-
tatives of the used car industry,39 but that challenge and seemingly the
rule itself, were rendered moot by the exercise of a congressional veto.4 1
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Chadha"' has apparently revitalized the Used Motor Vehicle
Rule litigation. Should the rule survive that litigation, sales techniques
and quality expectations in the used car industry will certainly change,
but the effect will not be as severe in Louisiana as elsewhere."'
36. Compare Hill v. John L. Crosby, Inc., 353 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977)
and Hermeling v. Whitmore, 140 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) (prescriptive period
for houses built for speculation) with Matthews v. Rudy, 4 La. App. 226 (2d Cir. 1926)
(prescriptive period for house built on owner's lot and according to owner's specifications).
The building contractor is not liable for attorneys' fees, Bourgeois v. Kirkland, 399 So.
2d 1203 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), but he is often required to be an advisor to the owner.
See Fire Protection Equip. Co. v. Rabinowitz, 194 So. 733 (La. App. Orl. 1940). A building
contractor could be required to warn the owner of any problem or condition of which
he is or should be aware that might cause an unsatisfactory result. See Wurst v. Pruyn,
250 La. 1109, 202 So. 2d 268 (1967) (building contractor should have known of a soil defect
and advised the owner of the need to take corrective action); Spring v. Stevens Ready-Mix
Concrete, 343 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (paving contractor had duty to warn
customer that concrete should not be poured when there is a high probability of rain);
Kunnes v. Bryant, 49 So. 2d 872 (La. App. Orl. 1951) (painting contractor must advise
homeowner that painting over a surface previously painted with creosote may not yield
a satisfactory result); A.B.C. Oil Burner & Heating Co. v. Palmer, 28 So. 2d 462 (La.
App. Orl. 1946) (air-conditioning contractor is under a duty to advise owner that existing
water line was insufficient for satisfactory operation of contemplated air-conditioning system);
Matthews v. Rudy, 4 La. App. 226 (2d Cir. 1926) (building contractor must disclose to
homeowner any ,insufficiency in the foundation soil of which he is aware). Compare Dyess
v. Weems, 178 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965) with Rinaudo v. Treadwell, 212 La.
510, .32 So. 2d 907 (1947) (implied warranty as to potability of well water).
37. The cause of action of the purchaser of a flood-prone home against the realtor
and lender would be in tort for fraud or negligence. See Payne v. Trichel, 397 So. 2d
16 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977),
writ denied, 355 So. 2d 549 (La. 1978). The Payne decision demonstrates the prescription
problem inherent in a tort action; however, the court expresses doubt that a financial in-
stitution owes a duty of disclosure to the home purchaser. 397 So. 2d at 21. Cf. Hersbergen,
Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Banking Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 247, 263 (1983).
38. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,329-41,378 (1981) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 455). See general-
ly Hersbergen, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Consumer Protection, 42 LA. L. Rav.
513, 513-17 (1982).
39. See K. Gibbs Schools v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979).
40. S. Con. Res. 60, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. H-2856 (1982).
41. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
42. See Hersbergen, supra note 38, at 517-19.
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Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages For Mental Anguish
The developments in the law applicable to damages recoverable by
a consumer for breach of contract have been traced in this forum in two
of the last three years. Following the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson"3 and Ostrowe v. Darensbourg,"
the courts of appeal have consistently applied Civil Code article 1934(3)
restrictively, denying mental anguish damages in numerous consumer
cases.4 5 In two recent cases, mental anguish damages were allowed, but
in factual situations easily within article 1934(3) and distinguishable from
Meador and Ostrowe." Additionally, the third circuit recently awarded
mental anguish damages to the purchaser of redhibitorily defective home
carpeting in McManus v. Galaxy Carpet Mills.4 7 The author of the majority
opinion in McManus distinguished a breach of contract to provide
carpeting for a home from a breach of contract to construct a "distinc-
tively designed home,"" which was the object of the contract in Ostrowe.
43. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976), discussed in Hersbergen, Developments in the Law,
1981-1982-Consumer Protection, 43 LA. L. REV. 343, 344-45 (1982); Hersbergen,
Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Consumer Protection, 41 LA. L. REV. 443, 470-71
(1981).
44. 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979).
45. Maltzahn v. Roch, 427 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (construction of a
concrete garage slab); Williamson v. Alewine, 417 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (truck
repair); Guthrie v. Rudy Brown Builders, 416 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982) (home
sale); Cobb v. Coleman Oldsmobile, 393 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (automobile
sale); Guidry v. Statewide Trailer Sales, 393 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (construc-
tion of a concrete mobile home slab); Walker v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 391 So.
2d 925 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980) (contract of insurance); DeBlieux v. Arkla Indus., 390
So. 2d 233 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (sale of central air-conditioning system); Elliott v. Loui-
siana Intrastate Gas Corp., 390 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (contract granting a
pipeline servitude); Martin v. Buick Co., 386 So. 2d 987 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (construc-
tion of a fireplace). In several other cases, the object of the contract was arguably "intellec-
tual enjoyment," but the plaintiff failed to prove this point. Schreck v. One Hour Mar-
tinizing, 394 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (dry cleaner ruined a dress); Bowes v.
Fox-Stanley Photo Prods., 379 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (photo processor lost
plaintiff's film); cf. Gele v. Markey, 387 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1980) (breach of lease by lessor
resulted in the loss of lessee's merchandise and the termination of lessee's business, but
lessee did not prove that he actually suffered emotional distress).
46. Vick v. National Airlines, 409 So. 2d 383 (La. App: 4th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs'
vacation plans were disrupted by airline's breach of contract to fly them nonstop from
New Orleans to Miami); Smith v. Andrepont, 378 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979)
(mental anguish damages allowed where a horse, purchased for "show" purposes, was pos-
sessed of a redhibitory vice).
47. 433 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983). The first circuit had previously applied
Meador to the purchase of defective carpeting by a carpeting retailer for resale to customers
in Stratton-Baldwin Co. v. Brown, 343 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
48. Ostrowe v. Darensbourg, 377 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (La. 1979).
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Judge Guidry dissented, being of the opinion that the majority's attempt
to distinguish the two factual situations was unsuccessful."9
Perhaps the Louisiana Supreme Court should re-examine the policy
foundation of Meador and Ostrowe,. rather than attempting to provide
more definition to those cases. The application of Meador and Ostrowe
to the purchase of unique things such as distinctively planned residences,
personalized vehicles and the like is clearly muddled and unsatisfactory.
If the matter does come before the court, or perhaps the legislature, the
psychological aspects of c6nsumption should be examined, for the con-
sumer purchase often entails more mental facets than the decisions in
Meador and Ostrowe are willing to recognize."0 Even if the court or
legislature is not interested in such psychological factors, the weakness
of Meador and Ostrowe is demonstrated by reference to the principle of
good faith performance provided in Civil Code article 1901-a principle
which neither case serves and one which the court may have undermined
by the two decisions.
49. 433 So. 2d at 858-59, 863.
50. For example, consideration is warranted by the 1937 landmark study, Middletown
in Transition, in which the Lynds concluded:
[Flascinated by a rising standard of living offered them on every hand on the
installment plan, they [the middle class] do not readily segregate themselves from
the rest of the city. They want what Middletown wants, so long as it gives them
their great symbol of advancement-an automobile. Car ownership stands to them
for a large share of the "American dream;" they cling to it as they cling to self
respect ....
R. LYND & H. LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION 26 (1937). The conclusion of David
Caplovitz in his study, The Poor Pay More, is also noteworthy in this context:
[C]onsumption in our society ... is more than a matter of getting and having
material conveniences. Equally important, Americans in all walks of life are trained
to consume in order to win the respect of others and to maintain their self-respect.
These social pressures to consume are perhaps inevitable in a society characterized
by a rising standard of living.
D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 180 (1963). Also, Eli Chinoy observed in his study
of the aspirations of automobile workers: as they were confronted with the inability of
movement into the ranks of management, and "with their wants constantly stimulated by
high powered advertising," they tended to shift their aspirations from the occupational sphere
to the consumption sphere, measuring and projecting their success in terms of what they
were able to buy. Chinoy, Aspirations of Automobile Workers, AM. J. OF Soc. 57, 453-59
(1952); see also R. NADER, L. DODGE & R. HOTCHKISS, WHAT TO Do WITH YOUR BAD
CAR 5-6 (1971).
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